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1: INTR ,ODUCT 
The major changes in the environment of business in the 1990's, 
for example the globalisation of markets, the completion of the 
single market in the EC, and most recently the opening of Eastern 
Europe to market forces, highlight the need for a model of 
industry dynamics. The ways in which industries and firms change 
over time has proved to be very difficult to portray within causal 
models. Samuelson (1947) drew distinctions between economic 
systems in terms of static, dynamic, and stochastic systems. 
Economists have been successful in building causal models within a 
comparative statics framework and have made considerable advances 
in modelling dynamic systems *where there is continuity in the 
underlying behaviour patterns and the data which represent them. - 
Historians have a rich tradition of analysis but one which 
focusses on the classification and understanding of events without . 
attempting to provide causal models for projection into the 
future. In strategic management research there is a great need to 
develop dynamic and causal models. By a dynamic and causal system 
we mean (following Samuelson) one where given the initial facts 
there is sufficient material to predict what will happen, say, ten 
years thereafter. Clearly systems of interest to us will also 
have elements of both the historical and the stochastic and these 
should be reflected in our ten year view. 
This need to understand better the dynamics of industries is the 
more pressing given the major economic changes that are taking 
place in our environment. Companies are having to make larger and 
larger investments in physical, human, and intellectual capital to 
cope with demands from markets. All of these require a longer 
view and much more explicit thinking about long term positioning 
in markets. In formulating their views companies will be looking 
for a closer understanding of the changes in industry structure 
that are implied by these great issues of the day. Scenario 
writing as developed at Shell (Wack 1985a, 1985b) was one attempt 
to take an explicit and long term "what-if" view. Ansoff's 
writings (Ansoff 1984) on strategic issue management and the use 
of weak signals were another important contribution. The work of 
Penrose (1959) and Marris (1964) sparked off the interest in 
constraints to growth faced by firms. Little, however, has been 
written on the dynamics of industry structure following Porter's 
early comments on industry evolution (Porter 1980). One exception 
was Lawrence and Dyer (1983) who provided a framework from an 
organisational perspective showing the ways in which firms adapt 
over the long period. 
This paper advances one way in which a more analytical approach to 
long term industry change can be developed. "Longer term" is 
taken to be a period beyond which the lives of the principal fixed 
assets will have expired (either through use or obsolescence) and 
major reinvestment decisions will have to be addressed. The model 
starts with the familiar, static concepts of industry structure, 
borrows ideas from strategic group theory and extends these to __ . . 
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horizons extend. The accessibility of different parts of the space 
(the sub-spaces) depends on the ways in which barriers to movement 
(mobility barriers) within the space change over time. The key to 
the practical implementation of the model is the identification of 
the relevant mobility barriers and the ways in which the costs of 
mobility will vary as a result of changes in the underlying 
industry conditions (such as legislation on non-tariff barriers to * 
trade). 
The model is developed in non-mathematical terms and is 
illustrated by reference to the prospects for long term change in 
the food processing industry in Europe. Much discussion of 
industry change is now conducted in terms of globalisation or 
Europeanisation/regionalisation. The European food processing 
industry was chosen because in many ways it is a controversial 
sector in which to review the global/national competitive debate 
. and to argue for major investment decisions designed to upset the 
industry order. It is traditionally a country-centred industry 
marked by strong brands, conditioned by retailer buying power and - 
quite short term in its thinking. Any argument for globalisation 
is predicated on the view that some process of homogenisation of 
consumer preferences does exist, is continuing and that from it 
arise attractive target market segments for goods and services 
defined across national boundaries. Following from that are 
issues of scale and focus advantages in addressing such segments. 
The food industry is a particularly interesting vehicle for an 
anlysis of trends in globalisation since it as a "worst case". No 
other industry faces such deeply rooted culture-bound notions of 
"taste" as those concerning eating habits. If change in consumer 
preferences and competitive strategies can be demonstrated for 
this industry, it would provide a significant addition to the 
debate so far. 
2: THE IDEA OF STRATEGIC SPACE 
Porter's (1980) popularization of the competitive strategy 
framework laid some emphasis on the evolution of industries and 
the triggers behind such long term shifts. This, however, has 
been a relatively neglected issue both in the academic and more 
practitioner-based writings. Porter correctly emphasized the need 
for a dynamic analysis of industries but it has been his static 
analysis of industry structure that has received most attention. 
The long term development and evolutionary paths of industries and 
markets can and have been chronicled historically but not much 
attention has been paid to the dynamics of change and the 
associated patterns of asset accumulation by incumbents and by new 
entrants and to the tactical exploitation of the newly developed 
positions. The use of a comparative statics framework can fail to 
interpret the ways in which fundamental shifts take place. 
Any analysis of the dynamics of an industry structure at some 
future date requires a careful understanding of the interplay 
between competitors and the way this is likely to evolve over 
time. Porter's (1980) generic strategies give no more than a 
starting point in categorizing the available sources of 
competitive advantage. Some further work has been done to develop 
different industry typologies from which more specific competitive 
1985). However, these elaborations of the original 
still silent on the dynamics of industries. 
m 
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To ascribe industry evolution to fairly broad shifts in underlying 
. demand and cost conditions begs the question of how, precisely, 
firms will adjust their assets over time in order to compete more 
effectively. The sum total of that set of asset adjustments will 
constitute the new, perhaps still evolving industry structure. 
The tool which enables us to bridge the gap between firms with all 
their idiosyncrasies and the nebulous concept of loose 
associations known as industry is the notion of Strategic Groups. 
The term was coined by Hunt (1972), popularized by Caves and 
Porter (1977) and has been the subject of much attention since. 
It has been dekcribed by McGee (1985) as 
f’ a 
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Essentially strategic groups are groups of firms in an industry 
which follow the same or similar strategies. The strategies are 
described in terms of the assets of firms from which group members 
develop their market position ing and competit ive tactics. Thus 
high volume capital- intensive product ion line s promote a quite 
different outlook on competit ive beha viour th ,an small scale, ha 
I 
,nd 
crafted production techniques. The essence of group membership is 
that asset configurations represent "mobility barriers" (Caves & 
Porter, 1977; McGee 1985) which inhibit group members from 
acquiring alternative assets but which also protect them from 
members of other groups acquiring similar assets to their own. 
Thus an industry can be seen to be consist of structures within 
structures. The broad category "industry" is notoriously 
difficult to define with any precision. But the internal 
structures within an industry-- the strategic groups - can be 
defined with some accuracy in terms of the nature of the assets 
specific to each group. - 
The key, we argue, to t he understanding of industry evolution 
in the ways in which fi rms change these asset structures. In 
other words the ways in which mobility barriers change should 
the focus of attention. Oster (1982) wrote: 
lies 
be 
1’ ..at the heart of strategic group theory is the idea that 
there are rigidities to change." 
Changes in mobility barriers provide the explanation of 
differences between industry structures over time. Potential 
profit differences between groups can exist only when barriers to 
casual or opportunistic imitation of strategic position are 
present. The strategies of firms are concerned on the one hand 
with erecting and sustaining mobility barriers and exploiting the 
relative competitive advantages they represent in the market 
place. But strategies are also concerned with finding ways around 
mobility barriers so as to compete in other, more profitable ways. 
Thus industry evolution is a product of the ways in which mobility 
barriers decay and others arise in their place. 
. 
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chain), production and logistics assets ("upstream"), and 
infrastructure and corporate assets. 
These mobility barriers are assets created by firms in response to 
the competitive environment faced by the firm but are conditioned 
by the firm's history and culture, in particular its historic 
accumulation of tangible and intangible assets. Where external 
events are dramatic in character and foretell fundamental changes 
in demand and cost conditions then firms' strategic responses are 
the more likely to disengage from traditional patterns of 
incremental accretion of assets and to focus more on the creation 
of new assets. Thus, external events are frequently the triggers 
of change within firms insofar as firms are capable of 
interpreting the signals contained in these events. We argue that 
certain facets of the (expected) changes in Europe are 
sufficiently discontinuous in character so as to change the views 
of firms as to the assets that will be appropriate in the period 
following the creation of the. Single Market. However, we are not 
confident that the available signals are uniform in character and - 
capable of unambiguous interpretation. 
Before looking more closely at the strategic group structures 
within the food industry we review the long term evolution of the 
industry up to the late 1980's. 
3: STRATEGIC SPACE ANALYSIS OF THE FOOD INDUSTRY 
3.1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
The food processing industry has passed through a number of phases 
each with its particular set of asset structures and business 
concepts. The industry has seen a period of wholesaler domination 
(Kaldor, 1980), followed by manufacturer domination in the 60's - 
the period of the scale economy brander (Foy 1980), then the rise 
of the retailer in the 70's (Segal-Horn & McGee, 1989), to be 
followed, it is said by some, by a new era in which the Euro- 
Consumer will emerge. . 
The Scale Economy Brander 
The consumer packaged goods industries (including the food 
processing industry) enjoyed halcyon days in the sixties. This 
was a period when mass markets were growing quickly, retail 
distribution was highly fragmented, economies of scale were 
available, and processing technologies were proprietary. These 
substantial economic advantages were buttressed by the creation of 
mass marketing systems comprising national media advertising, 
national sales forces, and increasingly sophisticated marketing 
support services. The visible output of this business system was 
the brand, the repository of guarantees to the customer of product 
qualities arising from proprietary technology. The creation of the 
brand was subject to many economies of marketing scale, and 
fostered scale economies available elsewhere in the system. The 
brand was the visible symbol of the manufacturers' strength, and 
was the visible barrier to entry behind which grew a series of 
5 
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The Rise of the Retailer 
The heyday of the scale economy brander (the late 60s) was, 
however, a period in which the-seeds of change were already 
evident. The large retailer was becoming more and more 
significant. His position was fostered by the abolition of Retail 
Price Maintenance in 1964 allowing retailers the opportunity to 
compete on price. Furthermore processing technology was diffusing 
and becoming less proprietary. Quite suddenly the balance of 
power shifted from the manufacturer to the retailer, just as in 
the 1930s it had shifted from the wholesaler to the manufacturer. 
The emergence of large scale national retailers made for dramatic 
change. The consumer was now faced with a new proposition. 
Price-led competition was supported by an outlet brand (as 
distinct from a product brand). This was furthered by the entry 
of smaller scale processors who could now find ready customers in 
the private label retailers and whose access to technology and to 
effic ient plant wa s not dete 
addit ion retailers began to 
their bus iness the reby dilut 
-- 
rred by proprietary technology. In 
reorgan ize the inward logistics of 
ing the distribution economies of the 
major manufacturers and making-it possible for further new entry 
by specialized distribution companies. The emergence of national 
accounts diluted also the national sales forces of processors and 
undermined their product management structure. 
This is by now a familiar story moderated only by a degree of 
variance between product groups (in some instances brands have 
held up remarkably well e.g. breakfast cereals). 
The strategic initiative were captured by retailers and by the new 
entrants into food processing. The major change was the 
concentration of retailing as the majors built larger and larger 
outlets, concentrated on price competition, and steadily widened 
their businesses to include distribution, branding, research (a 
little) and development (much more), and wider and wider product 
ranges. The retail trade was able to turn brands into 
commodities, to brand themselves rather than their products, and 
was able to gain very substantial efficiencies. Strategic change 
in retailing was bound to have very substantial effects on the 
strategic position of manufacturers. 
The Rise of the Euro-Brander? 
Existing EC food law defines detailed requirements on the 
composition of specific foodstuffs. These have proved difficult 
to agree, are quite complicated and are full of numerous national 
exceptions (derogations). According to MAC (1988): 
"nearly every EEC country operates with different label 
requirements, which implies that an EEC producer is 
effectively prohibited from using a uniform label for its EEC 
sales. The amount of information required on the label 
varies from country to country . . . Exhaustive requirements 
like this . . . form a subtle but effective barrier to trade." 
The Commission's proposed legislation is contained in four 
exceptions, to provide a more informative system of food labelling 
and to set general food safety and hygiene standards. 
At first sight these may seem to be unpromising triggers for major 
change. MAC (1988) examined trade barriers in ten product sectors 
identifying over 200 barriers (not all of which would be subject 
to removal by the new directives). MAC estimate that the 
quantifiable direct benefits of removing these barriers are 
themselves signif,icant amounting to 2 - 3% of industry value 
added. But they go on to say that the indirect net benefits would 
be larger, including the broadening of consumer choice, a 
significant increase in trade, efficiency gains, and an 
improvement in the competitiveness of EEC food companies vis-a-vis 
the rest of the world. 
MAC (1988) gives some examples of these benefits and concludes: 
"The existence of trade barriers . . . has served to protect 
potentially weak domestic companies, and inversely, has 
encouraged strong companies to expand domestically rather 
than attempt cross-border expansion. These features of trade 
barriers have reinforced the relative fragmentation of the 
. EEC food industry. Removal of these barriers should decrease 
or eliminate these tendencies". 
Riesenbeck (1988) argues that (1) national markets are becoming 
saturated and life cycles of competitive advantages are shortening 
forcing companies to segment more finely and concentrate on 
acceleration of new product development, (2) there is an 
increasingly international orientation of consumers and a growing 
homogeneity of demand around the world, (3) the importance of 
international sourcing is rising, and (4) that entry and exist 
barriers have bken reduced as the level of fixed assets required 
has fallen. These views are in the spirit of Ohmae (1985) and of 
Levitt (1983). Taken in conjunction with the decreasing 
importance of national laws, regulations, and tastes and the 
liberalization of capital markets we have the a priori case for 
changes in structural conditions and a shift towards a more 
"European" industry. 
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A new orientation to markets may take some time to gather pace. 
But there is already a new attitude to manufacturing. A number 
of different strands are visible. First, many manufacturers are 
searching for plants flexible enough for a wide product range SO 
as to serve fragmenting markets. It is also becoming clear that 
in many industries there are gains to be realized from 
rationalizing manufacturing capacity across Europe (Cecchini 
1988). In particular some are looking for single scale efficient 
sourcing for European markets. Finally, there are those seeking 
Thus, in addition to market choices, there are significant 
manufacturing plant and product range choices to be made. These 
are discussed further in the following section. The industry in 
the 1990's promises to be very different from the two previous 
periods in which first the manufacturers and then the retailers 
held the strategic initiative. 
3.2 STRATEGIC GROUPS IN THE FOOD INDUSTRY 
A simple bivariate analysis can capture the most important 
characteristics of the industry. The importance of brands in the 
food industry cannot be overemphasized. -National branding is the 
traditional source of competitive advantage and brand share is 
commonly associated with superior profitability (see PIMS 
database). The size of national retailers (in the X at least) 
has substantially eroded the strength of many, but not all, 
brands, replacing product branding with their own form of outlet 
branding (private labelling)., However, this is more evident in 
the UK than elsewhere. In general, manufacturers' brands remain - 
significant but are focussed on national markets. 
MAC (1988) shows that out of a sample of 46 EC-based food 
companies, a half have a presence in two EC countries or less 
(Table 1 below). Building the geographic coverage of key brands 
is held to be of increasing competitive significance. It lies 
behind the patterns of acquisitions, disposals, and "swaps" which 
is well advanced among US food companies and is getting under way 
in Europe. 
TABLE 1 
Average Major Countries per Product Line 
for EC-Based Companies 
1 country 6% 
1-2 countries 44% 
2-3 countries 24% 
3-4 countries 17% 
>4 countries 9% 
Source: MAC (1988) 
This is shown in the Gogel/Larreche (1989) Competitive Posture 
matrix (Figure 1 below) which compares the relative strength of 
US, Swiss and EC companies on the basis of product strength and 
geographic coverage. They conclude that the US food companies are 
significantly further advanced than the Europeans in both brand 
strength and geographic coverage, whilst the Swiss are 
significantly stronger in geographic coverage. 
FIGURE 1 HERE 
Our analysis follows the same approach (Figure 2 below) but for 
brand or product strength we substitute marketing intensity, a 
measure of the costs of marketinq relative to total costs or to 
the nature of costs in the marketing function, specifically the 
possibilities to exploit scale effects in marketing across borders 
to larger market sizes. Production and logistics characteristics 
are not represented in the grouping analysis partly because these 
assets did not seem to act as a discriminator between the groups. 
We try to cope with this in the commentary. R&D capability is to 
some degree reflected in the marketing dimension insofar as 
branding often demands proprietary process knowledge and 
development skills. 
FIGURE 2 HERE 
These groups may be characterized as: 
A: Multinational Branders 
B: National Branders 
c: Weak National Branders with Direct Branding for retailers 
outside home territory 
D: National Direct Branders 
[Footnote: These groups are based on cluster analyses of some 
markets, interview data with industry executives, and the 
researchers' own judgement. These groups should be treated as 
hypotheses to be statistically tested.] 
The Multinational Branders are multinational companies operating 
multiple, related consumer goods businesses across the world, with 
strong perceived product differentiation accompanied by strong 
branding. These companies are traditionally multidomestic in 
character (as opposed to global\transnational, see Bartlett %t 
Ghoshal (1989) and Porter (1986)). 
The National Branders are nationally based and focussed companies 
with very high levels of marketing support for a product range 
limited by the standards of the Multinationals. 
The Weak National Branders are typically not national market 
leaders and probably not large in absolute terms. They supplement 
their local brands with opportunistic own brand supplies into 
other national markets in order to maintain volume. [Note, this 
category is probably not uniformly present across the different 
food sectors]. 
National Own Branders focus on low cost production (sometimes with 
advanced production processes) and supply retailers within their 
own countries. 
The mobility barriers attached to these groups are summarized in 
Figure 3 below. In general these barriers are sufficiently high 
to permit some degree of stability in these structures. For 
multinationals the barriers re very high and are being 
deliberately raised by the group through increasing levels of 
advertising and expansion of international operations. Rapid ' 
inflation of media charges have the effect of increasing the 
barriers as well. The competitive threats are probably felt to be 
from *within the group although the own branders limit the price 
premiums by their activities and the National Branders compete 
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The National Branders are also in a good defensive position with 
local first mover advantages that are difficult to overcome. They 
seek to maintain the barriers with heavy marketing support but are 
becoming increasingly vulnerable on price as new products become 
more difficult to launch. The Weak National Branders are probably 
in the most exposed situation. They are susceptible to brand 
competition on one side and low price competition on the other. 
They strive to create a defensible position through strategic 
pricing and attempts to be very flexible with their production 
plant. 
. FIGURE 3 HERE 
The National Own Branders are also in a potentially difficult 
position. Their barriers arise from strategic investment in 
sufficiently large and advanced manufacturing facilities so as to 
obtain economies of scale. In sectors where scale effects are 
minimal then intra- group rivalry is very high and incursions from 
foreign own branders is a dangerous threat. New entrants from 
outside the industry might find this group a useful bridgehead 
. 
into the industry (see McGee and Thomas (forthcoming) for a review 
of Sequential Entry strategies). 
3.3 ANALYSIS OF THE STRATEGIC SPACE 
The results of a cluster analysis by Duckett (1990) on one sector 
of the industry suggests that the strategic space in which these 
groups are held is sufficiently large and has enough "empty" space 
to allow for possible shifts in the group configuration. Figure 4 
(below) illustrates the way in which the Strategic Space can be 
divided (for illustrative purposes) into a three by three grid. 
Existing groups A, B C, & D take four of the spaces leaving five 
further possibilities for us to consider. Duckett's cluster 
analysis used advertising intensity as a proxy for marketing 
intensity. He assumed that intensity of advertising above 15% was 
not sustainable thereby setting an outer bound to the strategic 
space. Moreover the levels of advertising intensity chosen to 
define the sub spaces reflect the realities of the strategies they 
define. Thus a pure own brand strategy is consistent only with 
very low levels of advertising (less than 1%) whereas a national 
branding operation in the UK would typically require a figure in 
excess of 6%. The precise boundaries would be affected by the 
product category. 
FIGURE 4 HERE 
The effect of the Single Market legislation and of the Food 
Directives in particular is to make individual country markets 
more accessible not more identical. In the longer term consumers 
in different national markets may indeed converge around some 
common standards but for the moment the immediate opportunity is 
for companies to reconstruct their production and logistics assets 
to achieve the efficiencies implied by freer movement of goods. 
The longer term opportunity is to achieve very considerable 
possible efficiencies in marketing to larger segments across 
national boundaries. There will therefore be pressures to drive 
companies "Northwards" in this strategic space. 
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Own branders will be tempted to move into sub-space X to supply 
similar own brand products across wider areas. However, the real 
prize will be to supply own brands to retailers across Europe 
(sub-space V). The advantages will arise from full exploitation 
of potential scale economies especially in production. Lower cost 
distribution will assist the move and there might be rewards from 
greater concentration vis a vis the retail trade. However, the 
difficulties will lie in the degree of national differences to be 
imposed on the standard own brand product and the different 
legislative environments that will still have an impact regardless 
of the Single Market. Harmonization should make a considerable 
difference to the present situation. The little rivalry from 
other groups outside the own brand sectors make this attractive 
although within the own brands the rivalry could be intense. The 
keys to success are likely to be the ability to meet retailers' 
demands for advanced products at low cost through scale efficient 
and perhaps technically advanced production facilities. First 
mover advantages might be considerable particularly if the market 
is limited. The viability of sub-space X depends on the viability . 
of v. If the latter exists it will dominate the regional 
suppliers because of scale depending on the limits to scale 
effects in production. One scenario would have the regional move 
as a stepping stone on the way to "full" European coverage. 
Another might see the regional player as a more natural unit but 
locked in fierce rivalry with those both bigger and smaller. 
Retailers may well play a significant role in determining the 
outcome by virtue of the way they can exercise their current power 
in allocating contracts, sponsoring new players, and forming joint 
ventures. 
Sub-space 2 is sandwiched between powerful national branders and 
national own branders. There will continue to be a fragmented 
rump of marginal players but Europe will not offer them any 
special opportunities except perhaps through some form of 
consolidation. 
Sub-space W will become very interesting. In theory this will be 
the home of pan-European Branders pursuing a strategy of marketing 
a common branded product throughout Europe. This would allow 
economies of scale to be achieved in all functions including 
marketing leading therefore to rather lower marketing intensities 
than their multidomestic rivals. They would be insulated from the 
price competition of the own brands and would be at least 
potentially formidable competitors for nationally based brands - 
and this includes those Multinational and National players who do 
not opt for a trans.European style of operation. An incredsingly 
European media, lower logistics costs, and the relaxing of 
legislative differences plus increasingly homogeneous consumers 
would all make a trans.European group the more likely to be 
viable. Essential to success will be the ability to organize and 
manage in a transnational style, something which Bartlett & 
Ghoshal (1989) observe is poorly practised anywhere in the world 
let alone by European companies. The prospect looks attractive 
but the journey may be hazardous. 
Sub-space Y can be called the regional brander and has some 
parallels with the regional own-brander. It is a natural 
expansion path for the national branders as well as a possible 
route of develaament for the weak national branders alongside them 
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rivalry in this area. The Multinationals will be anxious to 
preserve their (national) brand positions especially if they are 
seeking to Europeanize their brands. The remaining national 
players will be very actively seeking to defend their positions 
against attacks from trans-Europeans, Multinationals, the power of 
retailers, not to mention any new regional branders. 
The weak national branders in the centre of the Strategic space 
are going to feel encircled if the growth in own brands across 
Europe and the development of trans.European brands takes place. 
The emergence of strong groups in X and V, regional and European 
own branders, would make their opportunistic plays across national 
boundaries extremely marginal. This group like the one underneath 
it is likely to become fragmented and only marginally profitable. 
The Multinationals are well placed to defend themselves and would 
enjoy either the status quo or a very slow change process. 
However, they are also very well placed to see and understand the 
opportunities, particularly those opportunities that would enable - 
them to improve their global position. So the stakes are very 
high for this group. Any move to a transnational or trans- 
European style would compromise their huge investments in national 
brands and in country management structures. The immediate 
opportunity to rationalize production and logistics across Europe 
will give them a very good picture of how a marketing change or 
revolution might be managed at a later date. Their great 
advantage over the national players is their international 
experience and one would expect them to capitalize on this. So on 
the whole we would expect to see a gradual migration into the 
trans.European group. 
The national branders are faced with great opportunities but 
probably see them as immense difficulties. Their great strength 
is local\national and there is always likely to be some room for 
the new niche players of Europe. The big uncertainty is that no- 
one can say how much room. On the other side the opportunity to 
expand looks fraught with uncertainty. The international 
expertise is not there nor are there the organizational subtleties 
and skills required to manage across borders. Many of these 
players will seek collaborations and alliances as early steps. 
They will experiment with regional moves and hope to move in the 
direction of W, the trans.European. But this will very likely 
take a long time - the mobility barriers are very high. 
Figure 5 illustrates the possible shifts in the strategic group 
configuration over time. Dates have been included but are no more 
than educated guesses. As the picture shows this suggests that 
1992 will cause some major discontinuities with major implications 
for existing strategic groups, members of which may be forced to 
exit from the industry, alter their strategy, or seek salvation in 
conjunction with others. 
FIGURE 5 HERE 
The industry is likely to go through a confused and uncertain 
period over the next five years as competitors interpret the 
signals from the environment, seek to consolidate their existing 
positions, and anxiously explore potential new moves. Many 
. 
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and for the industry to begin a clear convergence onto a new 
structure. If first-mover advantages are thought to be 
substantial, then many companies will have to reconsider their 
traditional attitudes to the risk-return trade-off. 
Following from this analysis we anticipate two main avenues for 
strategy change as the food industry evolves over the next ten 
years or so. The first will be a restructuring, consolidation, 
efficiency-seeking change. There will be a large reduction in 
numbers of plants and numbers of companies. There will be some 
simple closures and re-allocations of production within firms. 
There will be a spate of acquisitions of companies with 
distinctive assets such as brand names or distribution (but 
probably not manufacturing). Many small and smaller firms will be 
compelled to exit. The driving force in this scenario is the 
search for low cost through efficiency in production, 
distribution, and marketing. By itself this might not be so 
dramatic but for the strong possibility of new forms of 
- competition based on new segmentation, branding, and new products. 
So there will also be a premium on the rediscovery of marketing 
(especially international marketing skills) facilitated by joint 
ventures (products for markets, for example), and swaps of 
facilities to round out product lines and segment portfolios. The 
conjunction of efficiency seeking with marketing and product 
innovation is likely to prove complex and highly disturbing. In 
the new structure as it stabilizes there are likely to be many 
simultaneous strategic groups co-existing with some comfort. But 
in the evolution towards this there is likely to be a great deal 
of confusion and experimentation as companies seek for new 
understandings and new positions. 
4: UNDERSTANDING THE INDUSTRY DYNAMICS 
Section 3 outlined the historical developement of the European 
food industry and the nature of the strategic groupings within the 
industry. The traditional barriers protecting these groups are now 
being removed or undermined making possible a repositioning and 
restructuring of the strategic group structure. The analysis of 
strategic space in section 3.3 argued that a combination of 
exogeneous and endogenous factors will move European food 
companies progressively '*Northward" on the Strategic Space map 
towards two currently vacant strategic spaces in which will be 
found Pan-European Own Branders and Eurobranders respectively. 
Along with strong National Branders and Multinational Branders 
these will constitute, it is argued, a new pattern of strategic 
groupings a new structure of competition in the European food 
industry of the next century. 
For this scenario to come true, the mobility barriers preventing 
this movement "Northward" must seen to be diminishing in strength 
relative to the mobility "capacity" of the firms involved. We 
would expect to see companies making particular kinds of 
investments in products, technologies and brand names, as well as 
adopting different approaches to manufacturing, marketing and 
distribution. In this section, specific pieces of such evidence 
will be presented and discussed. Although much of this evidence 
icr +rafwnanted and pfjntr~dfcf-arv, as would be exoected in an 
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The principal themes which emerge from the evidence are cost-push 
and demand-pull. The "cost" theme addresses the possibilities for 
change in scale economies and for other step changes in unit 
costs. The "demand" theme contains the debate about the emergence 
of Euro-markets at the expense of national markets. At this point 
the linkage between globalisation and Europeanisation should be 
evident since the cost-push and demand-pull themes are the same 
for both and the overlap features so strongly in the evidence 
discussed below. 
In her Europe-wide survey of senior business executives 
Vandermerwe (1989a) found a number of common expectations 
concerning environmental and consumer behaviour changes which 
would accompany the Single Market. Although not specific to food 
companies, they give a useful picture of variables common across 
sectors. Increased market opportunities from greater pan-European 
receptivity to standardised goods and services, enlarged niches, 
more rapid product diffusion, greater homogeneity combined with - 
complexity, regional rather than national market focus. Cost- 
reduction was seen as arising from harmonised technical and 
environmental standards, rationalised product ranges, increased 
scale reducing production costs, Europe-wide sourcing, cheaper and . 
faster physical distribution combined with more centralised 
warehousing, shared centralised R & D costs and streamlining of 
organisational and administrative functions. Threats were seen 
overwhelmingly in terms of increased intensity of competition from 
a variety of sources such as better prepared and equipped 
"outsider" new entrants, "unfair" competition from state 
monopolies or low wage EC economies, emergence of gaps between 
smaller companies and giants. Changes in consumer behaviour were 
expected to involve greater price-sensitivity, more demanding, 
better informed customers, less culture-bound or patriotic 
consumer spending, and greater interest in global products and 
brands. Industrial customers are expected to increase pressure to 
reduce and equalised prices while more centralised buying 
functions replace country sourcing with Europe-wide or global 
sourcing. 
Vandermerwe describes the major strategic marketing adjustments 
being made as a visible shift to more "European-ness". Europe- 
wide positioning of corporations, products and brands to provide a 
. strong pan-European image and a standard or similar EC marketing 
programme. However, the industry is said to be fragmented in 
structure and local in character (Burns, Mcinerney, & Swinbank, 
1983; Swinbank & Burns, 1984; Capara, 1989; Sparks, 1989). The 
food processing companies have operated close to their suppliers, 
distributors and end-consumers. Any shift towards Vandermerwe's 
"European-ness" policies would constitute a radical change in the 
structure and competitive behaviour of the industry. 
4.1 MARKETS AND MARKETING STRATEGY 
Harmonisation of food regulations mean that existing as well as 
new products will be available to European-wide consumers, 
creating the necessary initial conditions for increased 
homogenisation of food tastes. The emphasis placed by so many . 9 1 * 3.. - --- -- I-I--- __ ___s_ A--- ---- ;Lz 1 a :. CCAWehwBAd#Y i m 
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at the beginning of any real effort at Europe-wide demand- 
creation. However, Vandermerwe (1989b) constructs a model of pan- 
European marketing which rests on a division into regional mass- 
clusters, regional niche- clusters, and local niche-markets and 
argues that protected markets and niches will vanish and that 
marketing strategies will have to recognise a Europe-wide system. 
Given the vehement views expressed in this national versus 
standardised consumer tastes argument (Capara, 1989), it is 
interesting to note the experience of the UK chocolate 
confectionery market, the richest chocolate market in Europe. A 
53% increase in imports in 1989 made Britain a net importer of 
chocolate for the first time. Reasons for the shift include the 
stocking of continental chocolates by UK mass retail chains such 
as Marks & Spencer and the dynamic entry of Jacobs Suchard into 
the mass chocolate bar market. However, more far-reaching general 
trends in demand-creation are at work. Retailers are increasingly 
sourcing their own-label products abroad and this trend is seen by 
the industry (Cadbury Annual Review, 1989) as being reinforced by - 
the influence on consumer taste of foreign travel and Pan-European 
advertising. So, more international sourcing by retailers and 
changing consumer preferences appear to be dominant influences. 
Some of the most vehement rebuttal of a pan-European approach 
occurs with regard to the management of international marketing 
activities. This is largely because of the pivotal role performed 
by the marketing function in the close tracking of consumer 
preferences and the management of local market infrastructure 
which, it is said, must be carried out as close to the markets as 
possible. The fact that this function can now be performed as 
well or better by retailers' point-of-sale data-capture technology 
makes it even more critical for the manufacturers to do this 
effectively. Nevertheless, considerable commonality in 
international marketing activities has been occurring for some 
time. Consider the data in Table 2 provided in 1975 by Sorenson 
& Wiechmann. 
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TABLE 2 
Degree of Marketing Standardisation among 
Selected US and European Multinationals 
Elements of Marketing Programme Degree of Standardisation 
1 Product Characteristics 
2 Brand Name 
3 Packaging 
4 Retail Price 
5 Basic Advertising Message 
6 Creative Expression 
7 Sales Promotion 
8 Media Allocation 
9 Role of Sales Force . 
10 Management of Sales Force 
11 Role of Middleman 
12 Type of Retail Outlet 
High Medium Low 
81 4 15 
75 5 20 
56 14 30 
71 6 20 
62 4 34 
56 11 33 
43 10 47 
74 10 15 
72 10 17 
80 7 13 
59 7 34 
Source: Sorensen R. & Weichmann U. (1975) 
From Table 2 standardisation is particularly evident with respect 
to brand name, product characteristics, role of middleman, 
packaging, role and management of sales force and basic 
advertising message. These are all still considered controversial 
areas for standardisation, yet more recent research confirms these 
conclusions. Takeuchi & Porter (1986) examined some of the most 
common activities within the marketing function based on ease or 
difficulty of international coordination. The results as given in 
Table 3 were reached in the context of judging the tradeoff 
between the organisational costs of coordination and the scale 
economies available from standardisation. Table 3 gives their 
assessment of the extent to which national differences make 
standardisation of particular marketing activities easier or more 
difficult. 
TABLE 3 
Ease/Difficulty of Standardising Marketing Activities 
Across Countries 
EASIER MORE DIFFICULT 
- brand name - distribution 
- product positioning - personal selling 
- service standards - sales person training 
- warranties - pricing 
- advertising themes - media selection 
Source: Takeuchi & Porter, 1986 
These kinds of araumments implv a chain of causation running from 
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creati on of cons umer tastes suffi ciently homogeneous to 
such m .arketing a pproaches. Howev er, the push for strong 
produc t position ing and brands is not driven solely by 
consid erations 0 f cost. Major fo od companies with quali 
do per form stron gly (see Table 4) and are featuring prom 
the co rporajze re structuring and a cquisition activity cur 
taking place in the food sector. 
TABLE 4 
Movement in Share Price of Companies 
with Strong Brand Portfolios 
Company 
Ord Shares 
Cad Schws 
Dalgety 
Grand Met** 
Guinness 
RHM 
Rcktt & 
Unigate 
UB 
Notes: 
Source: 
co1 
jus tify 
Pr *oduct 
tY brand 
,ine ntly 
ren tlY 
Price at Price at % change %gain/loss %gain/loss 
13/3/88* 20/7/89 
ind?ndex mktoyndex - 
277~ 450p +65.7 +30.0 +31.7 
273~ 395p +44.7 +13.5 +15.0 
481~ 581~ +20.8 -5.2 -4.0 
302~ 525~ +73.8 +36.3 +38.2 
329p 455p +38.3 +8.5 +lO.O 
815~ 12oop +47.2 +15.5 +17.0 
268~ 415p +54.9 +21.5 +23.1 
265~ 405p +52.8 +19.8 +21.5 
*Date of "dawn raid" on Rowntree by Suchard 
**Under performance of Grand Metropolitan principally due 
to market caution following the f3.1 bn Pillsbury/Burger 
King acquisition 
Stobart 1989 
s, 
S 
in 
4.2 MANUFACTURING AND LOGISTICS STRATEGIES 
As a relatively low-cost products, total physical distribution 
costs for food average around 18% of total costs and for commodity 
items can be as high as 35% (Penman, 1989). However, faster, 
cheaper transportation and access to cheaper labour within the EC 
together with the scale effects from rationalizing production 
(Cecchini 1988) could lead to a fall in transport costs by as much 
as 10% (Commission of the EC, 1988). Sharman (1989) also 
speculates that Europe could follow the US and experience an 
increasing number of competitive "Less Than Truck Load" (LTL) 
shipments allowing faster customer service, reduced inventoriess 
and potenbtial competition in smaller, previously uneconomic, 
fringe markets. As Sharman points out logistsics strategy is 
intertwined with other aspects of strategy and .the secondary 
effects of lower transport costs could be considerable (see Figure 
6 below). 
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In transportation and distribution, retail concentration is a key 
factor determining the shape of the industry and its cost 
structure. In the Southern EC economies (Italy, Spain, Portugal, 
Greece and Ireland) retail concentration is relatively low and 
immense opportunities for restructuring and increased 
concentration are thought to exist. High retail concentration is 
itself a trigger for distributor concentration since it 
foreshadows a shift from manufacturers' own transport to the use 
of specialist contract distribution companies and common user 
systems. For example, as the large UK retail companies have 
entered Europe, they have taken with them their distribution 
practices and expertise (eg Marks & Spencer in France). Increases 
in retail concentration in Europe can be expected to lead to the 
greater use of centralised distribution and specialist 
distribution contractors. The development of European buying 
associations and consortia (eg Argyll, Casino, Ahold, Rinascente, 
Dansk, ICA, & Migros in 1989) are therefore significant for the 
food processing sector. Retail consortia are not just joining 
together to buy products. Smiddy (1989) sees further, more 
sophisticated procurement benefits in the joint purchase of 
I vehicles, computers, systems software, etc and possibly even in 
the eventual international transfer of trading formats. 
The restructuring of distribution will benefit non-European as 
well as European producers. American and Japanese producers will 
be able to import through centrally-placed Holland and Belgium and 
then truck throughout Europe (Penman, 1989). Also noteworthy is 
the effect on specific product categories (such as fresh, chilled 
and frozen produce), of cost reductions from shorter journey times 
and, most importantly, from dramatic technological developments in 
transportation. For example the development of the "Freshtainer" 
system can extend the life of fresh foods up to 5 times by the use 
of computer-controlled temperature, humidity and atmosphere 
levels. Its effect on the scope of market development for such 
products as fresh fruit, flowers, vegetables, poultry, meat and 
fish, i s obvious 
consump Ition cate 
eating and the " 
especial1 
gories bene 
greening" 0 
Y since there are also high-growth 
fi ting f rom th .e trends to healthy 
f Europe an con sumers (Elkington, 1989). 
In terms of manufacturing strategies in Europe, the typology 
. suggested by Collins, Schmenner & Whybark (1989) is helpful. From 
the experience of a small but internationally-based group of major 
companies all currently coping with multi-plant manufacturing in 
Europe, trends toward consolidation of previously fragmented 
operations were clear. They define a plant's "charter" in terms 
of product range, technologies employed, and geographic markets 
served. Figure 7 illustrates this for product range and 
geographic coverage together with the military shorthand which 
describes the possible charters. 
FIGURE 7 
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European Manufacturinq - Plant "Charter" Matrix 
No. of Weapons (Product Lines) 
Many Few 
Many 
Geographic 
Responsi- 
bilities 
(Country 
Markets 
Served) Few 
NAVAL FLOTILLA MISSILE SILO 
INFANTRY TANK CORPS 
Source: Collins, Schmenner & Whybark (1989) 
Only one of their companies used the 'missile silo' charter for 
all its plants, primarily because its world-wide manufacturing 
strategy was established that way at the outset. For the other 
companies a mixture of charters was the norm. However as 
competition across Europe has intensified, cost pressures have led 
to rationalisations to prune excess equipment and under-utilised 
capacity. Most often, manufacturing strategy repositioning has 
been towards the *missile silo' plant charter, ie increased 
product focus combined with pan-European manufacture. In the 
cases where major repositioning has not taken place, there have 
been simplification of plant charters. These were usually 
achieved by a combination of product swapping among plants, 
product reassignments or simply plant closures. 
Pan-European manufacturing has also been stimulated by the high 
cost of new product launches which favours pan-European product 
launches. However some food processing companies have retained 
'infantry' and 'tank corps' plants for products considered heavily 
nationally based and with high transportation costs. Some changes 
were discernible even here with increasing acceptance of 
multilingual packaging and questioning of assumptions that a 
proliferation of products were necessary to meet market needs. 
When one of the multinational food processors reduced five 
different recipes for the same product to just one, no discernible 
effect on demand occurred. 
Common denominators which emerged for manufacturing included 
consolidation of previously fragmented operations, simplification 
of operations, and an increasing globalisation of the scope and 
impact of manufacturing operations. Moreover the successes 
achieved by pan-European pioneers' increased competitive pressure 
for the rest to follow. Their ability to do so was found to be 
greatly influenced by the differing characteristics of firms. 
Maior mobility barriers included a lack of pan-European managers 
19 
to match pan-European plants and the effect on the relative power 
of country managers. 
This approach strongly reinforces the choice of geographic 
coverage and brand characteristics as key strategic dimensions in 
this industry and suggests an increase in the degree of 
integration within firms of their manufacturing and marketing 
operations. 
4.3 CORPORATE STRATEGIES 
Evidence from food companies concerning their overall corporate 
strategies is difficult to pinpoint and even harder to assess. 
Unilever, one of the major European food companies, sees changes 
in all three types of mobility barrier. With regard to market 
segmentation and product lines, the Chairman's view is that 'the 
Europeanisation of eating habits is moving ahead slowly but 
surely' (Maljers, 1989). He expects uniformity of markets to be 
achieved alongside a greater variety of products. Maljers also 
regards industry characteristics as moving in favour of big 
international companies who will be better able to pursue the 
increasing economies of scale available in production, marketing 
and distribution* 
Unilever expects ‘a downward trend' in production locations. The 
present 2000plus sites in sixteen European countries will be 
gradually reduced in terms of organisation characteristics (the 
third category of mobility barrier), both greater centralisation 
(eg of production) and greater diversity (eg between consumer 
products and food products) are expected, placing a premium on 
flexible management skills. The company's own evaluation suggests 
a slow but steady convergence on the demand side coupled with 
scale developments in manufacturing and distribution. 
As a long-established multinational brander, Unilever's present 
position on the strategic space map is clear - a Multinational 
Brander. Its view of prospective changes in the industry seems to 
be cost-driven rather than consumer-led so its journey from 
multidomestic to transnational is cautious and measured. It is 
therefore consolidating its position by anticipating the cost-push 
and responding to any demand-pull. 
By contrast with Unilever's strategic thinking and the clear pan- 
European and global thrust of Jacobs Suchard described below, the 
prospects in the European brewing industry are viewed quite 
differently by Guinness. Despite the widely recognised 
internationalisation of the brewing and drinks industries and the 
position of Guinness itself as a successful international brewing 
and drinks company, itbseems very conscious of the structural 
barriers to the development of pan-European brands (Sparks 1989). 
These barriers include a strong bias towards domestic manufacture 
or foreign manufacture under license arising from the high 
transportation costs of drinks, the differing national structures 
of distribution channels and outlets, returnable packaging 
regulations, a plethora of national recipes, and the range of 
national duty and VAT levels. Many of these, such as packaging, 
nirtl ate 2nd Aiitv 1 avnl e! Ann in nynpnec nf rhnnne due ta chanaes 
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and 1992-related exploration of tax harmonisation. Nevertheless 
Guinness itself appears unsure about the likelihood or 
significance of any or all of these factors. Its corporate stance 
towards prospective industry changes are therefore difficukt to 
assess. 
Domestic brewers dominate national markets although concentration 
levels vary dramaticallyfrom country to country (e.g. the classic 
proliferation of German small breweries compared to the UK's five 
major brewers with 75% market share, Heineken with 40% of its 
domestic market in Holland, and Carlsberg with 70% of the Danish 
Market). Gogel and Larreche (1989) expect scale-efficient brewing 
plants to emerge and launch into the fragmented German market from 
Holland (Heineken) or France (BSN). But, in Guinness' view, 
European brewers should not develop pan-European products but 
should continue to support national brand differences as the best -- 
defence against further incursions of multinational competitors. 
It is extremely difficult to reconcile this strategy with data on - 
rapid industry-concentration at a world level, with the top ten 
world brewers increasing their total share of the world beer 
market from 23% in 1978-to 42% in 1987 and five European companies 
in the world's top twenty brewing companies. The expectation is 
for increased competition in Europe from American, Japanese, 
Canadian and Australian brewers. 
Guinness thus appears to see the industry as polarising between 
increasingly powerful international brewing companies and strong 
national branders. At the same time it seems unclear to which 
group it belongs. Guinness' views on cost and demand factors 
place it firmly in the multidomestic camp, yet this position is 
'difficult to reconcile with the rapid international concentration 
and globalization taking place in brewing. This recalls our 
strategic space analysis in which we suggest that traditional 
multinationals may find themselves between strong national 
branders and transEuropean branders. That kind of three way 
competition is likely to be very fierce with a premium attached 
(perhaps) to successful early moves. Whereas Unilever's attitude 
to this three cornered fight might be described as flexible, 
Guinness appear to be reluctant participants in the global game. 
Jacobs Suchard is .an interesting example of a pro-active global 
marketing strategy with a high degree-of standardisation of 
activities. Its strategy was recently described by an Executive 
Vice-President as follows: 
- 
"At Jacobs Suchard we increasingly think global and not only 
in terms of 1992" (Zinser, 1989). 
Based on extensive economic, consumer and market research, 
Suchard's repositioning has involved addressing all three types of 
mobility barriers. Marketing goals include the extension of 
successful concepts from one country to another. This implies 
global brands, umbrella concepts, line extensions and the test 
conversion of key national brands. This echoes other radical 
industry views on the development of international food brands. 
Since new products are the least culture-bound (Quelch and Hoff, 
1986) they are often considered easier to market internationally LL-- *.-G mL 2 -- -r.Acf..mc" ETAI VA..* w a; tv** tka annar5lltt hirrh +aillly~ 
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"existing brands with a real product advantage or a 
distinctive positioning ('pillar' brands) should be looked at 
first" (Capara, 1989). 
AS an example of Suchard's aggressive internationalization of an 
established brand is the expansion of 'Milka'. Sold only in 
tablet form in 1985, it is now also sold as a countline, praline 
and seasonal, while expansion of its geographic spread in 1985 was 
to Austria, German, Switzerland, and France and in 1989 was to UK, 
Spain, Benelux, Italy, Holland, Argentine, Hong Kong, and Japan. 
With regard to product range, within each global brand Suchard 
practices harmonisation of recipes, packaging, sizes and line 
extensions combined with pruning of product ranges. Advertising 
implications of its global marketing strategy include a one copy 
strategy, one agency for the brand, harmonised advertising, a new 
approach to media planning and buying, and new advertising 
concepts. Since a global strategy is about change in the 
economics of the business as a whole, it carries implications 
beyond brand management, marketing and advertising. Production 
reorganisation for Suchard involved new investment in 
international manufacturing centres, yielding automated scale 
production, simplification of operations and plant closures. 
Changes in organisation structure and skills to improve 
coordination capability have led to an HQ of only sixty people, 
decentralisation as the key philosophy but reinf‘orced by 
multinational taskforces, global brand sponsorship, European key 
account management, one common language and a corporate style that 
is deliberately more aggressive and entrepreneurial. 
Suchard's view of developments in its own sect or and how to 
respond to them i s predicated on increasing ef fectiveness of 
world-wide media and continuing trade and indu .stry concentration. 
There is great cl arity in Suchard, both about its strategic 
positioning (tran snational brander) and the le verage behind it. 
Suchard sees itse If responding to, and partly creating, global 
demand convergent e with the international manu facturing centres 
and the other rel ated elements of the marketin g strategy represent 
a pro-active resp onse to the changing economic s of the business. 
This section has explored some of the manufacturing, logistics and 
marketing evidence for the change scenarios which we introduced in 
section 3. An issue of some importance has emerged. The 
Europeanisation or globalisation debate has primarily focused on 
market characteristics, changes in demand patterns, and the 
search for the Euro-consumer, i.e. the demand-pull side of the 
matrix. On this side there is much discussion but little hard 
evidence. It is even possible that historic market differences 
may eventually be seen as the artificial result of the ways in 
which manufacturers have operated. However this misses the main 
point about where the dynamic for globalisation resides. 
a Considering the weight of evidence on the cost-push side of the 
matrix, of technical and investment building-blocks already in 
place, the true engine for globalisation is the realization that 
unit costs can be significantly reduced. It is the cost drivers 
that are seen as the real pressure point for change and the real 
prize for pioneers. 
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4.4 THE ROLE OF ACQUISITIONS 
The previous section looked at the pressures for change arising 
from the way in which underlying changes in demand and cost 
conditions can change the nature of mobility barriers. This 
section looks briefly at the evidence of firms' "intentions" 
interpreted from their actual behaviour in terms of acquisitions 
and alliances. If we are to accept the notion that there will be 
strategic moves into vacant "spaces", we should expect at least 
some moves to create new competitive units via acquisition as 
opposed to the slower route of internal growth. Buiges & 
Jacquemin (1989) in their overview of strategies of firms in the 
large internal market observe that the majority of mergers and 
acquisitions in Europe are purely national (over 55% in 1987-8). 
But intra-community acquisitions considerably outnumber those in 
which one party is from outside the Community (29% compared with 
15% in 1987-8). 
Grover (1989) remarks that the food industry is in "the midst of a _ 
period of major structural change" and is "becoming increasingly 
consolidated by a few large companies". His starting point is 
that the northern European economies have very concentrated food 
industry structures but slow growth markets whereas the Southern 
countries have much more fragmented but high growth structures. 
Grover claims that 
“a handful of mega-scale food conglomerates is emerging, e.g. 
Nestle, Unilever, and BSN". 
He argues that the fragmented structure in the South has made 
these countries particularly inviting as takeover targets and he 
cites some fragmentary evidence on the rate of acquisitions in 
Spain and Italy in support. The main evidence, however, is 
contained in his table (reproduced as Table 5 below) which shows 
the number of domestic and cross-border takeovers in Europe in the 
food industry. Over one third of all takeovers between January 
1988 and May 1989 were cross border in character. Much of this 
activity Grover attributes to the building of transEuropean 
positions in which domination of particular product categories 
across Europe is being sought. 
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TABLE 5 
Number of Food Industry Mergers and Acquisitions 
January 1988 - May 1989 
Domestic Cross-Border 
Involving 
>50% of equity 
Others (mergers, 
minorities etc) 
Totals 265 . 139 404 
218 122 340 
47 .17 64 
Source: Grover 1989 
In section 4.2 above above we suggested that the high 
concentration in food retailing has implications for the food 
processors. In particular it is likely to lead to the emergence 
of TransEuropean own branders. This will be further fuelled by 
the emergence of European buyer groups (see previous section) will 
be a catalyst for the consolidation of food manufacturers. It is 
likely to be a catalyst also for onw branders seeing the 
opportunity to write ever larger contracts with these buying 
alliances. However, these experiments on the retailer side are 
still only in their early stages. Opinion on internationalisation 
of retailing (e.g. OXIRM 1989) suggests that international. 
retailing will start to become a new force across Europe, in which 
case ripostes from processors can be expected. 
The evidence on restructuring via acquisition is probably 
strongest from the experience of UK activity in the United States. 
Hamill and Crosbie (1989) report some statistics that show UK . 
acquisitions of food and drink companies in the USA rising from 
$lSmn in 1984 to over $7780mn in 1988 (Table 6 below). The 
average size of these takeovers has risen from about $5mn to a 
something in excess of $555mn. As a percentage of all UK takeover 
activity in the USA food and drink takeovers accounted in 1988 for 
over 25% whereas in 1984 it was less than one per cent. This 
represents a spectacular increase. The background to this is the 
maturity and slow growth in the British domestic market and the 
relatively higher growth prospects in the USA. However, Hamill 
and Crosbie point out the emergence of global strategies among UK ' 
food and drink companies in which acquisitions are seen as the 
vehicles by which "critical mas" can be achieved. Hamill and 
Crosbie go-on to suggest that the development of strong national 
and international brand portfolios is being fostered by a select 
group of multinational cbmpanies. Their evidence is by no means 
conclusive and does not itself discriminate between our strategic 
groups of Multinationals and Transnationals but does lend support 
to the general Northward movement in the Strategic Space. 
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Year 
TABLE 6 
UK Acquisitions in the US Food & Drink Industry 
1984-8 
Number Value Average Size Share of all 
UK Acquisitions 
$mn $mn % 
1984 3 15.6 5.2 .4 
1985 6 214 35.7 4.1 
1986 7 1081.4 154.5 6.0 
1987 8 1304 163.0 4.1 
1988 14 7782.3 555.8 24.5 
Source: Hamill 8t Crosbie 19.89 
Hamill and Crosbie supplement their statistics with brief reviews 
of five largest UK acquirers in the food and drink sector. Their 
prime conclusion is that the main objective of these companies has 
been brand leadership and market share in an industry which is 
becoming increasingly global. More pertinent is that these 
companies have chosen to pursue these ends primarily through 
acquisition. This contrasts with other better established 
international branders whose emphasis has been on 
internationalization of their existing portfolios with very 
selective acquisitions to fill in the gaps (e.g. Unilever and 
Suchard). 
The sheer scale of the UK acquisitions in the USA suggests an 
emerging view that multinational and transnational portfolios are 
becoming very much more important. The fragmentary evidence 
within Europe seems to point in the same direction. Within Europe 
we would expect to see more efficiency driven, rationalization 
acquisitions together with a stronger emphasis on own brands. The 
limited evidence suggests the European food conglomerate with a 
hortfolio of major,brands is already emerging. There appears to 
be little hard evidence yet for the rise of the genuine 
transEuropean brander. The power of the food industry still lies 
in its national brands and it is not at all clear just how quickly 
the power of the national brander will be challenged by the new 
Eurobranders. The strategic space model suggests the grounds on 
which the new competition can emerge but is silent, as yet, on the 
timing of the challenge. It does, however, suggest that the 
national brands may find it difficult in the long run to remain 
the dominant force in the industry. 
5: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has suggested one way in which a more analytical 
approach to long term industry change can be developed. The 
essence of our approach is to define the industry in terms of its 
strategic groups and to specify the nature of the mobility 
barriers which preserve these groups. We propose then that a -L--L--L- ----- w--Al..eGcI LA .*anrl Gn r.,k i ah tkn ltnmntvfl cnappq j n 
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migration between already existing groups. We suggest then that 
necessary (but not sufficient) conditions for change include 
requirements that mobility barriers in relation to the mobility 
capacities of the relevant competitors are declining. We suggest 
that evidence for such erosion in mobility barriers can usually be 
found in the conditions under which an industry is currently 
operating. 
As an illustration of this methodology we chose the food 
processing industry in Europe. We chose this because firstly it 
is a worst case, that is an industry so rooted in national 
preferences, national brands and national and multidomestic 
competitors that change would have to be fairly radical if it were 
to take-place at all. Second, it is an industry likely to be 
dramatically affected by the single market legislation of the EC. 
It is also an industry where the available data across such a 
broad sweep of activities is .so weak that a conventional economic 
or strategic analysis cannot be undertaken. - 
From industry sources and reviews, sector analyses, and current 
research reports, this paper has provided an account of the 
evidence for change in the industry so far and an assessment of 
its significance for structural and competitive change. It is 
argued that slow but real changes in demand, increased experience 
in standardization of international marketing, a step change down 
in physical distribution costs, and changes in warehousing and 
distribution technology when taken together strongly extend the 
possibilities for centralization of production, distribution and 
marketing in this sector. An interesting polarisation of 
corporate strategies in response to these new competitive 
possibilities appears to be emerging, reflecting the 
global/national debate. 
Our analysis three observations. First, two major new strategies 
are quite likely to emerge, viz the pan-European Own Brander and 
the TransEuropean Brander. Second, the strategic space analysis 
tells us something about the pathways to achieving these 
positions. Third, it also tells us something about the nature of 
the competition both en route and in the new structure. This 
approach does not tell us how long the process of change will 
take, nor does it say who will be the winners and losers. It is 
possible, however, to say something about the characteristics of 
the winners and losers. 
The inferences we have drawn from our data need testing. There 
are two lines of approach for future research. One is to develop 
better statistical measurement of the initial strategic group 
structure. This is technically possible with the various 
multivariate tools available but much still needs to be done on 
variable definition and measurement. Second, data on the 
underlying mobility barriers needs more rigorous examination than 
we have been able to provide in this paper. Progress on these 
lines would make a strategic groups and strategic space analysis a 
useful tool in the better analysis and understanding of industry 
dynamics. 
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